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Debt financing and investment, as the two basic financial business activities of 
corporation, are closely linked. Most of the discussion on the balance of financing 
will be involved in investment decision-making, and the study of the behavior of 
business investment often starts from the perspective of debt financing. Existing 
research results show that the liabilities-creditors conflict arising from debt financing 
will cause shareholders/managers' alternative assets and under-investment behavior. 
At the same time debt could reduce the over-investment behavior liabilities arising 
from the shareholders-managers of conflict. Soft budget constraint would wake 
contingent governance of debt. Different term structure of liabilities of the agency 
costs is also different. 
Based on the above ideas and the exciting study, this paper selects Chinese listed 
companies from 2003 to 2006 for the study samples. This paper inspects of the 
sample data of all listed companies, and distinguishes the nature of ownership 
(state-controlled listed companies & non-state controlled listed companies). At the 
same time, this paper researches the impact from debt maturity structure to 
corporation over-investment behavior by classification. 
   Empirical results show that there is a significant effect from the debt maturity 
structure to Chinese over-investment behavior. The correlation between the short-term 
liabilities and Chinese listed companies' over-investment behavior is negative. The 
correlation between the short-term liabilities and Chinese listed companies' 
over-investment behavior is positive. Because of the soft budget constraint, for 
state-owned listed companies, long-term liabilities for the effect of over-investment 
are greater than the non-State-owned companies. And short-term liabilities for the 
effect of over-investment are greater than the non-state-owned companies. We come 
to an conclusion based on the empirical analysis. This article also gives the 
recommendations and makes an prospect of future research. 
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    第一章为导论，共分三节。第一节为研究的背景和意义，第二节为研究内容
与研究方法，第三节为相关概念的界定。 
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净现值为负的项目。Artur & Pindado（2003）认为公司存在一个 优投资水平，
当实际投资量高于 优投资水平时即为过度投资。本文的实证研究部分依据
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    经理的这种过度投资行为虽然可以通过经理持股、薪酬计划或其它机制加以
引导, 但都不能使股东与经理的目标完全一致, 而且会带来各种各样的代理成本, 
如监督成本等。负债可以防止这种过度投资行为, 降低股东-经理人之间的代理成

















的性质, 即在企业正常经营情况下, 债权人按债务契约规定获取固定利息收入, 
债权人不拥有企业的剩余控制权，但当企业破产时，债权人可以通过清算获取企
业的剩余索取权。因此, 负债可以从两个方面降低股东-经理人冲突引起的代理成
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